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Abstract
We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as
a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer
of unknown type by oﬀering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The
timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of
buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses
of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog
oﬀers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm
and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this
Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs
with payoﬀ indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or
across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile oﬀered by firms there may
be multiple possible expected firm payoﬀs, all consistent with the rational op-
timizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these
indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the
market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over
catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which sup-
ports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a
mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we ad-
dress in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism - and
therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show
under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess
tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Firms often compete by oﬀering potential buyers catalogs of products and prices.
Examples of catalog competition abound. Fidelity Investments Inc. competes in the
mutual funds market by oﬀering investors a catalog of funds with diﬀering risks and
fee structures (e.g., equity funds, bond funds, index funds). California competes with
other states to attract businesses by oﬀering a catalog of amenities and taxes. Intel
competes with other high tech firms to attract top engineers by oﬀering a catalog
of compensation and benefit packages. Cell phone companies compete by oﬀering a
plethora of calling plans. And the list could go on. A common feature of all of these
examples is the presence of asymmetric information. Firms do not know all of the
relevant characteristics of potential buyers. By oﬀering a catalog each firm is better
able to screen potential buyers by allowing buyers to sort themselves. Moreover, by
oﬀering a well-chosen catalog of products and prices a firm may be able to deter
a competitor from defecting to a new catalog or to prevent such a defection from
eroding the firm’s customer base.
In this paper we model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric infor-
mation as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a
buyer of unknown type by oﬀering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. Thus
each firm’s strategy space is a set of catalogs. The buyer’s type parameter, known
to the buyer at the time the buyer chooses a firm and a contract, is known only up
to a distribution by firms at the time firms choose their catalogs.1 The timing in
our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types
known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent,
firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog oﬀers. In the second
stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from
that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric
information reduces to a game over catalogs with expected payoﬀ indeterminacies. In
particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any
catalog profile oﬀered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoﬀs,
all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types.
The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which
emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular
game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate for tie-breaking mechanism would be a
mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game.
We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental ques-
tion we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism?
1We can also interpret the model as one in which several firms compete in a market populated
by many buyers where each buyer is identified (or indexed) by a random type parameter and where
firms at the time they choose their catalogs only know the distribution of the type parameter in the
population of buyers.
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We make two contributions. First, we show that if the private information of the
agent is suﬃciently granular, that is, if the probability space of agent types is atomless
(for example, if the set of agent types is a Borel subset of RL and the distribution of
agent types is given by a density with respect to Lebesgue measure), then there exists
an endogenous Nash mechanism. Second, we show that even without the atomless
condition, there exists a randomized endogenous Nash mechanism. Thus we show
under fairly mild conditions on primitives that competitive contracting games - that
is, catalog games - naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash
equilibria.
The primitives of our model consist of a probability space of agent types, a com-
pact metric space of contracts, an agent payoﬀ function continuous in contracts and
measurable in types, and firm profit functions also continuous in contracts and mea-
surable in agent types (i.e., both agent and firm payoﬀ functions are Caratheodory).
While each firm’s profit function is continuous in contracts, each firm’s expected profit
function over catalog profiles, induced by the prevailing tie-breaking mechanism and
the optimizing behavior of the agent, is discontinuous. To deal with discontinuities in
expected profit we follow the seminal approach introduced by Simon and Zame (1990)
and formulate the game over set-valued expected catalog profits as a game with an
endogenous sharing rule. In particular, we begin by identifying a (measurable) se-
lection from the expected catalog payoﬀ correspondence such that the induced game
with firm expected profit functions over catalogs specified via this selection (i.e., via
this sharing rule) has a Nash equilibrium in mixed catalog strategies. Next, using
a beautiful measurable selection result due to Mertens (1987) and the classical Fil-
ippov’s Implicit Function Theorem (see Himmelberg (1975)), we show that if the
probability space of agent types is atomless, then this payoﬀ sharing rule can be
implemented by a mechanism mapping from agent types and catalog profiles into
firm-contract pairs with the property that for each given catalog profile the resulting
direct mechanism (a mapping from agent types into firm-contract pairs) is rational
and incentive compatible. Thus we conclude that the catalog game induced by this
endogenous mechanism has a Nash equilibrium in mixed catalog strategies, and thus
we conclude that this endogenous mechanism is Nash. In the absence of the atomless
condition, we show that this payoﬀ sharing rule (i.e., our selection from the expected
payoﬀ correspondence) can be implemented by a randomized mechanism. Thus we
conclude that in the absence of the atomless condition the catalog game induced
by this randomized endogenous mechanism has a Nash equilibrium in mixed catalog
strategies - and thus that this randomized endogenous mechanism is Nash.
Related Literature
There has been much work on catalog (or menu) models of competitive contracting
games. Most notably for the analysis we carry out here Page (1999), Peters (2001),
Martimort and Stole (2002), and Page and Monteiro (2003) have shown for various
versions of the competitive contracting game (or common agency game) that attention
can be restricted without loss of generality to games played over contract catalogs
rather than over indirect contracting mechanisms (see, for example, Theorem 2 in
Page and Monteiro (2003); also see Martimort (2006)).
3
While there has been much work on the relationship between catalog games and
competitive contracting games over mechanisms (direct and indirect), far less work
has been done on the Nash existence problem. In Page and Monteiro (2003) firm
profit functions are taken to be upper semicontinuous in contracts (rather than con-
tinuous in contracts as is assumed here) and a Nash equilibrium in mixed catalog
strategies is established under the assumption that each firm behaves as if all ties
will be broken in the firm’s favor. Under this optimistic tie-breaking rule each fir-
m’s induced expected profit function over catalogs is upper semicontinuous. The
existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is then established via Reny
(1999) by identifying conditions suﬃcient to guarantee that the mixed catalog game
is payoﬀ secure.2 In particular, Page and Monteiro (2003) first establish, under some
additional conditions on primitives, that no matter what the tie-breaking rule (or
mechanism), catalog games are uniformly payoﬀ secure.3 Next they show that if
the catalog game is uniformly payoﬀ secure, then no matter what the tie-breaking
rule the mixed extension of the game is payoﬀ secure.4 Together these two results
imply that the question of existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous mixed cat-
alog games reduces (via Reny (1999)) to a search for tie-breaking mechanisms which
guarantee that the induced expected profit functions over catalogs are at least recip-
rocally upper semicontinuous - a property guaranteed by the upper semicontinuity
of expected profits under the optimistic tie-breaking rule. In Monteiro and Page
(2006b), we introduce a more realistic tie-breaking rule - the eﬃciency rule - is intro-
duced. Under the eﬃciency rule contracts are awarded to firms which value it most
(i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit). Monteiro
and Page (2006b) show that under the eﬃciency rule firm expected profit functions
are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., that under the eﬃciency rule the mixed
2 It follows from Reny (1999) that a payoﬀ secure game with upper semicontinuous (or at least
reciprocally upper semicontinuous) payoﬀs over compact strategy sets has a Nash equilibrium.
Following Reny, a game is said to be payoﬀ secure if for every joint strategy, x = (xi, x−i), each
agent i has a strategy x∗i that virtually guarantees the payoﬀ he receives at x even if other agents
play strategies, x
3
−i, slightly diﬀerent from x−i.
Informally, payoﬀs are reciprocally upper semicontinuous if, whenever some agent’s payoﬀ jumps
down, some other agent’s payoﬀ jumps up (see Simon (1987), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), and
Reny (1999)). Reciprocal upper semicontinuity is implied by upper semicontinuity (but the converse
does not hold in general).
3A catalog game is uniformly payoﬀ secure if for every firm j, every catalog C∗j , and every ε > 0,
there exists a catalog eCj such that for any catalogs C−j oﬀered by other firms there is a neighborhood
of C−j such that
Πj( eCj , C−j) ≥ Πj(C∗j , C−j)− ε,
for all deviations C
3
−j in that neighborhood of C−j . Thus, the catalog game is uniformly payoﬀ
secure if for each firm j and each starting catalog strategy C∗j there is a defensive catalog strategy,
eCj , that firm j can move to in order to secure an expected payoﬀ of at least
Πj(C∗j , C−j)− ε
given any starting strategy profile, C−j , of other firms and any deviation by other firms to strategies,
C−j , in a neighborhood of C−j . A formal definition of uniform payoﬀ security is given in section 3.1.
4This connection between the uniformly payoﬀ security of a game and the payoﬀ security of its
mixed extension is extended to arbitrary compact games in Monteiro and Page (2006a).
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catalog game is reciprocally upper semicontinuous) - and therefore show that under
the eﬃciency rule a uniformly payoﬀ secure catalog game with payoﬀs only upper
semicontinuous in contracts has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In this pa-
per, we take a completely new approach based on Simon and Zame (1990). Under
our new approach the tie-breaking rule is determined endogenously. In particular, we
show that if profit functions are continuous in contracts (even though the induced
expected profit functions over catalogs are still only upper semicontinuous), then the
Nash problem reduces (via Simon and Zame (1990)) to an implementation problem -
that is, to a problem of finding an endogenous mechanism which implements the pay-
oﬀ sharing rule with respect to which there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
(...a payoﬀ sharing rule whose existence is guaranteed by Simon and Zame (1990)).
Our contribution viewed from this perspective is to show that this implementation
problem has a solution - that is that there exists an endogenous Nash mechanism.
The work most closely related to our analysis here is that of Carmona and Fajardo
(2006). Their strategy for solving the Nash problem diﬀers from our strategy. In
particular, they model the common agency game as an extensive game and then try
to extend Simon and Zame to show the existence of a sequential equilibrium. Here,
we show that the common agency game - because it is a Stackelberg screening game
- reduces by straight forward backward induction to a game (i.e., a catalog game)
already contained in the class of games covered by Simon and Zame. Hence under
our approach, no extension of Simon and Zame is required and, as noted above,
the Nash existence problem reduces to an implementation problem. For the case of
simultaneous move games with incomplete information and communication (i.e., for
the non-Stackelberg case where the type of reduction via backward induction carried
out here is not possible), Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2002) extend Simon
and Zame (1990) and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
We shall proceed as follows: In Section 2 we present the basic ingredients of our
model including the agent’s choice problem under catalog competition and the notion
of a tie-breaking mechanism. In section 3, we consider catalog games induced by tie-
breaking mechanisms and we introduce the notion an endogenous Nash mechanism.
Also in Section 3 we state our main results. Finally, in Section 4 we provide proofs of
our main results. Throughout we illustrate our model via an example of competitive
executive compensation.
2 The Catalog Model of Competitive Contracting with
a Privately Informed Agent
We construct a model in which m firms, indexed by i and j ( = 1, 2, . . . ,m ), compete
for the business of a single, privately informed agent via the catalogs of contracts
firms oﬀer to the agent. The agent represents for each of his types a buyer type in
the market. In our model, firms move first, simultaneously choosing their catalogs.
The agent moves second, choosing for each of his types a firm with which to do
business and a contract from that firm’s catalog. The game we shall ultimately
consider provides a model of how firms choose their catalogs in the first stage given
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the distribution of agent types (i.e., the distribution of buyers) and the optimizing
behavior of buyers in the second stage. We begin by considering the second stage,
that is, by considering the agent’s problem.
2.1 The Agent’s Problem
2.1.1 Agent Types and Contracts
We shall assume that
(A-1) the set of agent types is given by a probability space, (T,@,μ), where T is a
set of agent types, @ is a σ -field in T , and μ is a probability measure defined
on @.
Let K be a set representing all possible contracts firms can oﬀer the agent and
for each firm i = 1, 2, . . . ,m let Ki ⊆ K be the set of all possible contracts firm i can
oﬀer to the agent. Elements of K will be denoted by f .
We shall assume that,
(A-2) (i) K is a compact metric space, containing an element 0 which we shall
agree denotes “no contracting,” and (ii) Ki is a nonempty closed subset of K
containing 0.
Example 1 (Executive Compensation Contracts) Consider a situation in which sev-
eral firms compete for the services of an executive (an agent) of unknown type. To
begin, let (Z,B(Z), η) be a probability space of states-of-nature where Z is a metric
space equipped with the Borel σ-field B(Z) and η is a probability measure know to
all firms and the agent. Suppose that the set of all possible compensation contracts
is given by a convex set K of B(Z)-measurable functions defined on the state space
Z taking values in some closed bounded interval, [L,H], where L ≤ 0 < H.5 Under
compensation contract f = f(·) ∈ K, the executive is paid an amount f(z) ∈ [L,H] in
state z ∈ Z. Assume now that the set of compensation contracts K has the following
properties:
(i) K contains a contract,
0(·) : Z → [L,H],
such that
0(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z.
(ii) K is sequentially compact for the topology of pointwise convergence on Z, that
is, for any sequence of contracts {fn}n in K there is a subsequence {fnk}k in K and
a contract f  ∈ K such that
fnk(z)→ f (z) for all z ∈ Z.
5See Aliprantis and Border (1999) for a definition of B(Z)-measurability.
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(iii) K contains no redundant contracts, that is, if the compensation levels under
contracts f and f  in K diﬀer in some state of nature z ∈ Z, then the payoﬀs under
contracts f and f  diﬀer on a set of states having positive probability. Stated formally,
K contains no redundant funds if for any pair of contracts f and f  in K
f(z) 9= f (z) for some z ∈ Z, implies that
η {z ∈ Z : f(z) 9= f (z)} > 0.
The uniform boundedness of K (by L and H) together with conditions (ii) and (iii)
imply that the set of contracts K is compact and metrizable for the topology of point-
wise convergence (see Proposition 1 in Tulcea (1973)). In particular, under (ii), (iii),
and uniform boundedness,
dη(f, f
) :=
]
Z
f(z)− f (z)
 dη(z),
defines a metric on K which generates the topology of pointwise convergence6 and
makes K a compact metric space. Taking as the “no-contracting” contract the func-
tion 0(·), the set K satisfies (A-2)(i). If, in addition, we assume (a) that each firm
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m has available only a dη-closed subset of compensation contracts Ki ⊆ K
that can be oﬀered to the executive, and (b) that each firm-specific contract set Ki
contains the contract 0(·), then assumptions (A-2) are satisfied.
In order to allow for the possibility that some types of the agent may wish to
abstain from contracting altogether, we assume that there is a fictitious firm i = 0
with feasible set of contracts K0 := {0}.
Letting I = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}, define the set
K:= {(i, f) ∈ I ×K : f ∈ Ki} . (1)
A firm-contract pair (i, f) ∈ K indicates that the agent has chosen sales contract
f ∈ Ki from firm i, while (i, f) = (0, 0) ∈ K indicates that the agent has chosen to
abstain from contracting altogether. Note that the set K is a closed subset of the
compact set I ×K.7 Thus, K is a compact set.
2.1.2 Catalogs of Contracts
For each firm i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, let Ci be a nonempty, closed subset of Ki.We can think
of the subset Ci as representing a catalog of contracts that the ith firm might oﬀer
6Thus, for any sequence of contracts {fn}n ⊆ K and contract f  ∈ K, dη(fn, f )→ 0 if and only
if
fn(z)→ f (z) for all z ∈ Z.
7Equip I with the discrete metric dI(·, ·) given by
dI(i, i
) =

1 if i = i
0 otherwise.
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to the agent. For i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m, let Pf (Ki) denote the collection of all possible
catalogs, that is, the collection of all nonempty, closed subsets of Ki.8 Since Ki is a
compact metric space, the collection of catalogs, Pf (Ki), equipped with the Hausdorﬀ
metric h is automatically compact (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) for the definition
of the Hausdorﬀ metric and a discussion).
If firms compete via catalogs, then their strategy choices can be summarized via
a catalog profile,
(C1, . . . , Cm) . (2)
Here, the ith component of the m-tuple (C1, . . . , Cm) is the catalog oﬀered by the ith
firm to the agent. Let
P := Pf (K1)× · · · × Pf (Km)
denote the space of all catalog profiles. If P is equipped with the metric hP given by
hP

(C1, . . . , Cm) , (C

1, . . . , C

m)

:= max{h(Ci, C i) : i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}, (3)
then the space of catalog profiles (P, hP) is a compact metric space.
2.1.3 The Agent’s Choice Problem Under Catalog Competition
We shall assume that
(A-3) the agent’s utility function,
v(·, ·, ·, ·) : T × I ×K ×P→ R, (4)
is such that, (i) for each t ∈ T , v(t, ·, ·, ·) is continuous and for each (i, f, C) ∈
I ×K×P, v(·, i, f, C) is @-measurable and (ii) v(t, i, 0, C) ≤ v(t, 0, 0, C) for all
t ∈ T and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Note that we allow the agent’s utility to depend not only on the contract f but
also on brand name i (i.e., the name of the firm with which the agent contracts)
and the catalogs oﬀered by all firms. However, by (A-3)(ii) if the agent is to derive
any utility from a firm’s brand name beyond the reservation level, v(t, 0, 0, C), then
the agent must enter into a contract with the firm. Allowing utility to depend on
brand names does not rule out the possibility that some (or all) types of the agent
are completely indiﬀerent to brand names.
Example 2 (The Agent’s Utility Function for the Executive Compensation Example)
As in example 1, let K be a convex set of state-contingent compensation contracts
compact metrizable for the topology of pointwise convergence satisfying assumptions
(A-2). We shall assume that if the agent is of type t ∈ T and chooses to work for
firm i ∈ I, then the states of nature upon which compensation is based are generated
8Note that since K0 = {0}, Pf (K0) consists of one nonempty, closed subset, namely the set {0} .
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according to a conditional probability measure ζ(·|t, i) satisfying the property that for
each event E ∈ B(Z) and each firm i ∈ I
ζ(E|·, i) : T → [0, 1]
@-measurable. The conditional probability measure ζ(·|t, i) thus represents the sto-
chastic production technology available to firm i under the management of a type t
executive. Let
u(·, ·, ·, ·) : T × I × [L,H]×P→ R
be a function such that (i) for each t ∈ T , u(t, ·, ·, ·) is continuous on I × [L,H]×P,
(ii) for each (i, c, C) ∈ I × [L,H]×P, u(·, i, c, C) is @-measurable, and (iii) for each
C ∈ P and i ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,m, u(t, i, 0, C) ≤ u(t, 0, 0, C) on T . Finally, let the type t
agent’s (expected) utility over firm-contract-catalog profile 3-tuples be given by
v(t, i, f, C) :=
]
Z
u(t, i, f(z), C)ζ(dz|t, i).
Specified in this way, the agent’s utility function satisfies assumptions (A-3). Note
that we allow the type t agent’s expected utility over firm-contract pairs to be influenced
by the compensation catalogs oﬀered by all firms.
Given catalog profile C = (C1, . . . , Cm) the agent’s choice set is given by
Γ(C) = Γ(C1, . . . , Cm) := {(i, f) ∈ K : f ∈ Ci}, (5)
and the agent’s choice problem is given by
max {v(t, i, f, C) : (i, f) ∈ Γ(C)} . (6)
Under assumptions (A-1)-(A-3), for each t the agent’s choice problem has a solu-
tion. Let
v∗(t, C) := max {v(t, i, f, C) : (i, f) ∈ Γ(C)} (7)
and
Φ(t, C) := {(i, x, p) ∈ Γ(C) : v(t, i, f, C) = v∗(t, C)}. (8)
The set-valued mapping C → Φ(t, C) is a type t agent’s best response mapping.
For each catalog profile C ∈ P, Φ(t, C) is a nonempty closed subset of K. The
following Proposition summarizes the continuity and measurability properties of the
mappings, Γ and Φ, and the optimal utility function, v∗.
Proposition (Continuity and measurability properties): Suppose assumptions (A-1)-
(A-3) hold. Then the following statements are true. (a) The choice correspondence
Γ(·) is hP-continuous on the space of catalog profiles P (i.e., is continuous with
respect to the metric hP), (b) The function v∗(·, ·) is hP-continuous on P for each
t ∈ T, and is @-measurable on T for each C = (C1, . . . , Cm) ∈ P. (c) For each
9
t ∈ T , Φ(t, ·) is hP -upper semicontinuous on P and Φ(·, ·) is @×B(P) -measurable
on T ×P.9
The proof of the Proposition above follows from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 in Page
(1992).
2.1.4 Tie-Breaking Mechanisms
We shall denote by ΣΦ the set of all @ × B(P)-measurable selections from the best
response mapping,
(t, C)→ Φ(t, C),
that is, the set of @×B(P)-measurable functions
(t, C)→ (i(t, C), f(t, C))
such that
(i(t, C), f(t, C)) ∈ Φ(t, C) for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P.
We shall refer to each selection (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ as a tie-breaking mechanism.
Given tie-breaking mechanism (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) and catalog profile C ∈ P oﬀered by
firms, the corresponding mapping t→ (i(t, C), f(t, C)) is a direct contracting mech-
anism. Moreover, because
v(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C) = v∗(t, C)
for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P and for all (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ,
each tie-breaking mechanism (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ and each catalog profile C ∈ P
induces a rational and incentive compatible direct mechanism (i(·, C), f(·, C)). This
mechanism is rational because for all agent types t in T
v(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C) ≥ v(t, 0, 0, C), (9)
and it is incentive compatible because for all agent types t and t in T
v(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C) ≥ v(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C). (10)
Under tie-breaking mechanism (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)), given catalog profile C ∈ P oﬀered
by firms, it is intended that a type t ∈ T agent do business with firm i(t, C) and
enter into contract f(t, C) ∈ Ci(t,C). Moreover, because (i(·, C), f(·, C)) is rational
and incentive compatible, it is reasonable to assume that a type t agent will do as
intended by the mechanism (i.e., will obey the mechanism).
By the Kuratowski - Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Bor-
der (1999), p. 567), the set of tie-breaking mechanisms ΣΦ is nonempty.
9Here B(P) denotes the Borel σ-field in the compact metric space (P, hP). Moreover,
B(P) = B(Pf (K1))× · · · ×B(Pf (Km)),
where B(Pf (Kj)) denotes the Borel σ-field in the compact metric space of catalogs (Pf (Kj), h) (see
Aliprantis and Border (1999) Theorem 4.43, p. 146).
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2.2 Firms
2.2.1 The Firm’s Profit Function
We shall assume that
(A-4) the jth firm’s profit is given by the function,
πj(·, ·, ·, ·) : T × I ×K ×P→ R,
where (i) for each t ∈ T , πj(t, ·, ·, ·) is continuous and for each (i, f, C) ∈
I × K × P, πj(·, i, f, C) is @-measurable, and (ii) there exists a μ-integrable
function ξj(·) : T → R such that for each for each (i, f, C) ∈ I × K × P,
|πj(t, i, f, C)| ≤ ξj(t) for all t ∈ T .
Example 3 (Firm Profit Functions for the Executive Compensation Example)
Continuing our executive compensation example, for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, let firm j’s
profit be given by
πj(t, i, f, C) =
]
Z
(rj(z)− f(z))ζ(dz|t, j)

Ij(i)− hj(Cj , C−j)
where
Ij(i) =

1 if i = j
0 if i 9= j,
and where rj(·) : Z → R is firm j’s bounded, B(Z)-measurable, state-contingent gross
payoﬀ function and hj(Cj , C−j) is the fixed cost to firm j of oﬀering compensation
catalog Cj given the catalogs C−j oﬀered by other firms. If we assume that the fixed
cost functions are continuous in catalog profiles (with respect to the metric hP), then
company profit functions satisfy assumptions (A-4).
3 Endogenous NashMechanisms and Equilibrium in Cat-
alog Games
Each firm’s expected profit is determined by three factors: (i) the catalogs oﬀered by
all firms, (ii) the optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types (i.e., optimiz-
ing behavior of buyers in the market), and (iii) the tie-breaking mechanism which
prevails. But which tie-breaking mechanisms are reasonable? Can such a mechanism
be determined endogenously. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a game
over catalogs (i.e., a catalog game) to be played by firms in their strategic competi-
tion for the privately informed agent, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking
mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game.
We call such a mechanism a Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we wish to
address now is, does there exist a Nash mechanism?
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3.1 Catalog Games Induced by Tie-Breaking Mechanisms
Consider the collection of catalog games indexed by the tie-breaking mechanisms,
given by 
(Pf (Kj))
m
j=1, (Πj(i(·, ·), f(·, ·), ·))mj=1

(i(·,·),f(·,·))∈ΣΦ . (11)
with firm payoﬀ functions Πj(i(·, ·), f(·, ·), ·) given by
C → Πj((i(·, C), f(·, C)), C) :=
]
T
πj(t, (i(t, C), f(t, C)), C)dμ(t).
Next let ∆(Pf (Kj)) denote the jth firm’s space of mixed catalog strategies.
Note that because Pf (Kj) is a compact metric space (with the Hausdorﬀ metric),
∆(Pf (Kj)) is compact and metrizable for the topology of weak convergence of prob-
ability measures.
Given tie-breaking mechanism (i(·, ·), f (·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ with induced catalog game

(Pf (Kj))
m
j=1, (Πj(i
(·, ·), f (·, ·), ·))mj=1

,
the corresponding mixed catalog game is given by

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 ,

Qj(·, ·|(i(·, ·), f (·, ·))
m
j=1

,
where for mixed strategy profile (λ1, . . . ,λm) ∈ ∆(Pf (K1))× · · · ×∆(Pf (Km)),
Qj (λ1, . . . ,λm|(i(·, ·), f (·, ·)))
:=
U
PΠj((i
(·, C), f (·, C)), C)λ1(dC1) · · · · · λm(dCm)
=
U
P
U
T πj(t, (i
(t, C), f (t, C)), C)dμ(t)λ1(dC1) · · · · · λm(dCm)
and where recall P :=Pf (K1)× · · · × Pf (Km).
Definition 1 (Endogenous Nash Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium)
A tie-breaking mechanism (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ is an endogenous Nash mecha-
nism if the induced mixed catalog game

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)))mj=1

has a Nash equilibrium, that is, if there exists a mixed catalog strategy profile
(λ∗1, . . . ,λ
∗
m) ∈ ∆(Pf (K1))× · · · ×∆(Pf (Km)) := ∆(P)
such that for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
Q∗j

λ∗j ,λ
∗
−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

≥ Q∗j

λj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

for all λj ∈ ∆(Pf (Kj)).
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If (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ is an endogenous Nash mechanism with Nash equilibrium
(λ∗1, . . . ,λ
∗
m, ) ∈ ∆(P), then for all j = 1, . . . ,m,
maxCj∈Pf (Kj)Q
∗
j

Cj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

= maxλj∈∆(Pf (Kj))Q
∗
j

λj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

= Q∗j

λ∗j ,λ
∗
−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

,
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
(12)
where
Q∗j

Cj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)

:=
]
P−j
Πj((i∗(·, C), f∗(·, C)), C)λ∗−j(dC−j).
Thus, for each j = 1, . . . ,m,
λ∗j

arg max
Cj∈Pf (Kj)
Q∗j

Cj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

= 1. (13)
From the perspective of the jth firm, if the mixed catalog strategy, λ∗j , is the jth firm’s
part of a Nash equilibrium with respect to tie-breaking mechanism (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)),
then firm j will choose with probability 1 a catalog that maximizes
Q∗j

Cj ,λ∗−j |(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·))

over the jth firms feasible set of catalogs, Pf (Kj) - and thus will choose an optimal
catalog against the mixed strategies, λ∗−j , played by other firms given tie-breaking
mechanism (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)).10
3.2 The Existence of Endogenous Nash Mechanisms
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1 (Existence of Endogenous Nash Mechanisms)
Suppose assumptions (A-1)-(A-4) hold. If the probability space of agent types is
atomless, then there exists an endogenous Nash mechanism (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ.
Thus, the induced mixed catalog game,

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)))mj=1

,
has a Nash equilibrium.
10Here,
(λj ,λ∗−j) = (λ
∗
1, . . . ,λ
∗
j−1,λj ,λ
∗
j+1, . . . ,λ
∗
m),
C−j = (C1, . . . , Cj−1, Cj+1, . . . , Cm)
P−j = (Pf (K1)× · · · × Pf (Kj−1)× Pf (Kj+1), . . . , Pf (Km)) ,
and
λ−j(dC−j) =
T
i=j λi(dCi).
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A subset of agent types E ∈ @ is an atom in the probability space (T,@,μ) if
μ(E) > 0 and for all F ∈ @ such that F ⊆ E, either μ(F ) = 0 or μ(E − F ) = 0. If
(T,@,μ) contains no atoms, then it is said to be nonatomic or atomless. The atomless
assumption will be satisfied if, for example, T is given by
T := [a1, b1]× · · · × [aL, bL],
equipped with the Borel product σ -field and if the probability measure μ is given by
a density, that is, if for all Borel subsets E of T
μ(E) =
]
E
h(t)dσ(t),
where h(·) : T → R+ is a probability density function and σ is the Lebesgue product
measure on T.
Without the atomless assumption we can show that there exists a randomized
endogenous Nash mechanism. A randomized endogenous mechanism, denoted by
(αk(·), ik(·, ·), fk(·, ·))mk=0, consists of m+1, B(P)-measurable, nonnegative functions
α0(·),α1(·), . . . ,αm(·)
such that for all C ∈ P,
Sm
k=0 αk(C) = 1, and m+ 1 tie-breaking mechanisms
((i0(·, ·), f0(·, ·)), . . . , (im(·, ·), fm(·, ·)))
such that (ik(·, ·), fk(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ for all k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. The number αk(C) ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability that direct mechanism (ik(·, C), fk(·, C)) is selected under random-
ization (α0(C),α1(C), . . . ,αm(C)) given catalog profile C. Because
v(t, ik(t, C), fk(t, C), C) = v
∗(t, C)
for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P and for all (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ,
the agent has no incentive not to follow the selected direct mechanism and because
each direct mechanism (ik(·, C), fk(·, C)) is rational and incentive compatible the
agent has no incentive not to choose the firm-contract pair intended for his type
under the selected mechanism.
A randomized endogenous mechanism, (αk(·), ik(·, ·), fk(·, ·))mk=0 is Nash if the
induced mixed catalog game

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(αk(·), ik(·, ·), fk(·, ·))mk=0)mj=1

,
has a Nash equilibrium. Here
Qj (λ1, . . . ,λm|(αk(·), ik(·, ·), fk(·, ·))mk=0)
:=
U
P (
Sm
k=0 αk(C)Πj((ik(·, C), fk(·, C)), C))λ1(dC1) · · · · · λm(dCm)
=
U
P
U
T (
Sm
k=0 αk(C)πj(t, (ik(t, C), fk(t, C)), C)) dμ(t)λ1(dC1) · · · · · λm(dCm).
We now have our main result on randomized endogenous Nash mechanisms.
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Theorem 2 (Existence of Randomized Endogenous Nash Mechanisms)
Suppose (A-1)-(A-4) hold. Then there exists a randomized endogenous Nash
mechanism (α∗k(·), i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·))mk=0. Thus, the induced mixed catalog game,

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(α∗k(·), i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·))mk=0)mj=1

,
has a Nash equilibrium.
4 Proofs
4.1 Preliminary Lemmas
We begin by defining the following set-valued mapping which we will call the profit
possibilities mapping:
Ψ(t, C)
:= {π ∈ Rm : π = (π1(t, (i, f), C), . . . ,πm(t, (i, f), C)) for some (i, f) ∈ Φ(t, C)} .
For each agent type t and catalog profile C ∈ P oﬀered by firms, Ψ(t, C) is the set
of all profit possibilities for firms under some optimal firm-contract choice by the
agent. This correspondence has nonempty, compact values and by Theorem 6.5 in
Himmelberg (1975) is @×B(P)-measurable.
Lemma 1 (upper semicontinuity of Ψ(t, ·))
Under assumptions (A-1)-(A-4), the mapping Ψ(t, ·) is upper semicontinous on
P.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that Ψ(t, ·) has a closed graph. But this follows from the
continuity of profit function π1(t, (·, ·), ·) and the upper semicontinuity of the best
response mapping Φ(t, ·) on P.
Let ΣΨ denote the set of all @ × B(P)-measurable selections from the profit
possibilities mapping Ψ(·, ·) and let ΣΦ denote the set of all @ × B(P)-measurable
selections from the best response mapping Φ(·, ·). By Filippov’s Implicit Function
Theorem (see Himmelberg (1975) Theorem 7.1), for all ψ(·, ·) ∈ ΣΨ there exists
(i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ such that for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P,
ψ(t, C) = (π1(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C), . . . ,πm(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C)) .
Next consider the integral of profit possibilities mapping Ψ(·, ·) given by
C →
U
T Ψ(t, C)dμ(t) :=
U
T ψ(t, C)dμ(t) : ψ(·, ·) ∈ ΣΨ

.
Lemma 2 (upper semicontinuity of
U
T Ψ(t, ·)dμ(t))
Under assumptions (A-1)-(A-4), the mapping C →
U
T Ψ(t, C)dμ(t) is upper semi-
continous on P with nonempty, compact values in Rm.
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Proof. It suﬃces to show that
U
T Ψ(t, ·)dμ(t) has a closed graph. Let {(Cn, zn)}n
be a sequence in grph
U
T Ψ(t, ·)dμ(t)

⊆ P × Rm converging to (C, z) ∈ P × Rm.
Thus for each n
zn ∈
]
T
Ψ(t, Cn)dμ(t).
Corresponding to the sequence {(Cn, zn)}n let {ψn(·, ·)}n be a sequence in ΣΨ such
that for each n
zn =
]
T
ψn(t, C
n)dμ(t).
Thus, we have
z = lim
n
zn = lim
n
]
T
ψn(t, C
n)dμ(t)
By Fatou’s Lemma in several dimensions (Artstein (1979)), there exists a μ-integrable
function z(·) such that
z(t) ∈ Ls {ψn(t, Cn)} for all t ∈ T\N , μ(N) = 0,
and
z = lim
n
]
T
zn(t)dμ(t) =
]
T
z(t)dμ(t).
Now consider the minimization problem
min
z(t)− π(t, (i, f), C)
 : (i, f) ∈ Φ(t, C)

,
where
π(t, (i, f), C) = (π1(t, (i, f), C), . . . ,πm(t, (i, f), C)) .
Let
δ(t, C) := min
z(t)− π(t, (i, f), C)
 : (i, f) ∈ Φ(t, C)

for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P.
By Schal (1974), there exists a @ × B(P)-measurable selection (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ
such that
z(t)− π(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C)
 = δ(t, C) for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P.
The proof will be complete if we can show that δ(t, C ) = 0 for all t ∈ T\N.
First, let t ∈ T\N be given and without loss of generality assume that
ψn(t, C
n) = (π1(t, (int , f
n
t ), C
n), . . . ,πm(t, (int , f
n
t ), C
n))→ z(t),
where for each n, (int , f
n
t ) ∈ Φ(t, Cn). By the compactness of I ×K we can assume
without loss of generality that (int , f
n
t )→ (it, f t) ∈ I ×K. We already have Cn → C 
and thus by the continuity of πj(t, ·, ·, ·) on I ×K ×P,
(π1(t, (int , fnt ), Cn), . . . ,πm(t, (int , fnt ), Cn))
→ (π1(t, (it, f t), C ), . . . ,πm(t, (it, f t), C )) = π(t, (it, f t), C) = z(t).
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Moreover, because
(int , f
n
t ) ∈ Φ(t, Cn) for all n
and
Cn → C  ∈ P,
by the upper semicontinuity of Φ(t, ·), we have (it, f t) ∈ Φ(t, C ). Thus,
z(t)− π(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C)
 =
π(t, (it, f t), C)− π(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C)
 = 0
because (it, f

t) ∈ Φ(t, C) and (i(t, C), f(t, C)) ∈ Φ(t, C )
minimizes
π(t, (it, f t), C )− π(t, (i, f), C )
 over (i, f) ∈ Φ(t, C ).
Thus, δ(t, C ) = 0 for all t ∈ T\N .
Let
F (C) :=
U
T Ψ(t, C)dμ(t)
and
G(C) := coF (C),
where co denotes convex hull. If the probability space of agent types, (T,@,μ), is
atomless, then F (C) is convex for all catalog profiles C ∈ P and we have
G(C) := coF (C) = F (C).
We shall refer to the upper semicontinuous correspondence
C → G(C)
from catalog profiles P into the collection of nonempty, closed convex subsets of Rm
as the expected profit possibilities correspondence (see Aliprantis and Border (1999),
Theorem 16.36).
Now consider the game
ΓΨ := (Pf (K1), . . . , Pf (Km), G(·)) .
In the terminology of Simon and Zame (1990), the game ΓΨ is a game with an
endogenous sharing rule. A sharing rule is a B(P)-measurable function
g(·) : P→ Rm
such that
g(C) ∈ G(C) for all catalog profiles C ∈ P.
Thus the collection of all endogenous sharing rules for the game ΓΨ is given by the
set of all measurable selections from the expected profit possibilities correspondence.
Let ΣG denote the collection of all endogenous sharing rules and let ΣF denote the
collection of all B(P)-measurable selections from C → F (C). We shall refer to each
selection g(·) ∈ ΣF as an expected profit function. By Theorem 8.2 in Wagner (1977),
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each endogenous sharing g(·) ∈ ΣG, has a measurable Caratheodory representation
with respect to expected profit functions, that is, there exists
m+ 1 expected profit functions g0(·), g1(·), . . . , gm(·),
and m+ 1, B(P)-measurable nonnegative functions
α0(·),α1(·), . . . ,αm(·)
such that for all C ∈ PSm
k=0 αk(C) = 1 and g(C) =
Sm
k=0 αk(C)gk(C) ∈ Rm.
Definition 2 (A Solution for the Game ΓΨ)
A solution for the game ΓΨ is a sharing rule g∗(·) = (g∗1(·), . . . , g∗m(·)) ∈ ΣG and
a mixed catalog strategy profile λ∗(·) = (λ∗1(·), . . . ,λ∗m(·)) ∈ ∆(P) such that λ∗ is a
Nash equilibrium of the game (∆(Pf (Kj)), gj(·))mj=1, that is, such that for the mixed
catalog strategy profile λ∗,
]
P
g∗j (Cj , C−j)λ
∗
j (dCj)λ
∗
−j(dC−j) ≥
]
P
g∗j (Cj , C−j)λj(dCj)λ
∗
−j(dC−j),
for all firms j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and for all mixed catalog strategies λj(·) ∈ ∆(Pf (Kj)).
Lemma 3 (ΓΨ has a solution, Simon-Zame (1990))
Under assumptions (A-1)-(A-4), ΓΨ has a solution.
Let (g∗(·),λ∗(·)) be a solution to the game ΓΨ and suppose g∗(·) has Caratheodory
representation
g∗(C) =
m[
k=0
α∗k(C)g
∗
k(C),
where {g∗0(·), g∗1(·), . . . , g∗m(·)} ⊂ ΣF and {α∗0(·),α∗1(·), . . . ,α∗m(·)} areB(P)-measurable
nonnegative functions such that for all C ∈ P,
Sm
k=0 α
∗
k(C) = 1. We may think of
the number α∗k(C) ∈ [0, 1] as the probability that expected profit possibilities vector
g∗k(C) ∈ Rm will prevail under catalog profile C. Question: can each Rm-valued,
expected profit function g∗k(·) in ΣF be implemented by a tie-breaking mechanism in
ΣΦ? That is, does there exist a tie-breaking mechanism (i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ such
that for each firm j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and each function g∗jk(·), k = 0, 1, . . . ,m composing
the jth firm’s part of the Caratheodory representation we have
g∗jk(C) =
]
T
πj(t, (i∗k(t, C), f
∗
k (t, C)), C)dμ(t) for all C ∈ P.
Lemma 4 (Each expected profit function g(·) ∈ ΣF is implementable via a tie-
breaking mechanism)
Suppose assumptions (A-1)-(A-4) hold. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
1. g(·) = (g1(·), . . . , gm(·)) ∈ ΣF .
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2. There exists a tie-breaking mechanism, (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ such that for each
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
gj(C) =
]
T
πj(t, (i(t, C), f(t, C)), C)dμ(t) for all C ∈ P.
Proof. It is easy to see that (2) ⇒ (1), thus in order to complete the proof we
must show that (1) ⇒ (2). The key ingredient in establishing this implication is
the measurable ‘Measurable Choice’ theorem due to Mertens (1987). Let g(·) =
(g1(·), . . . , gm(·)) ∈ ΣF . Thus, for all C ∈ P,
(C, g(C)) ∈ graph(F ).
By Mertens (1987) there exists a measurable function
ζ : graph(F )× T → Rm
such that
g(C) =
U
T ζ(C, g(C), t)dμ(t) for all C ∈ P
and
ζ(C, g(C), t) ∈ Ψ(t, C) for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P
Thus, ζ(·, g(·), ·) ∈ ΣΨ, and thus by Filippov’s Implicit Function Theorem (see Him-
melberg (1975) Theorem 7.1), there exists (i(·, ·), f(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ such that for all
(t, C) ∈ T ×P,
ζ(C, g(C), t) = (π1(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C), . . . ,πm(t, i(t, C), f(t, C), C)) .
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the game with an endogenous sharing rule
ΓΨ := (Pf (K1), . . . , Pf (Km),G(·))
where
G(·) = coF (C) = co UT Ψ(t, C)dμ(t).
By Lemma 3 this game has a solution (g∗(·),λ∗(·)). Let
g∗(C) =
m[
k=0
α∗k(C)g
∗
k(C)
be a Caratheodory representation of endogenous sharing rule g∗(·) with respect to ex-
pected profit functions {g∗0(·), g∗1(·), . . . , g∗m(·)} and catalog dependent randomization
{α∗0(·),α∗1(·), . . . ,α∗m(·)}. By Lemma 4 each Rm-valued expected profit function g∗k(·),
k = 0, 1, . . . ,m, can be implemented via an endogenous mechanism (i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·)) ∈
ΣΦ such that for each firm j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
g∗jk(C) =
]
T
πj(t, (i∗k(t, C), f
∗
k (t, C)), C)dμ(t) for all C ∈ P.
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We have for all C ∈ P and k = 0, 1, . . . ,m,
g∗k(C)
= (g∗1k(C), . . . , g
∗
mk(C))
=
U
T π1(t, (i
∗
k(t, C), f
∗
k (t, C)), C)dμ(t), . . . ,
U
T πm(t, (i
∗
k(t, C), f
∗
k (t, C)), C)dμ(t)

.
Thus,
g∗(C) = (
Sm
k=0 α
∗
k(C)g
∗
1k(C), . . . ,
Sm
k=0 α
∗
k(C)g
∗
mk(C))
where for each for each firm j = 1, . . . ,m and each k = 0, 1, . . . ,m
Sm
k=0 α
∗
k(C)g
∗
jk(C) =
U
T (
Sm
k=0 α
∗
k(C)πj(t, (i
∗
k(t, C), f
∗
k (t, C)), C)) dμ(t).
Because (g∗(·),λ∗(·)) = (Smk=0 α∗k(·)g∗k(·),λ∗(·)) is a solution to the game ΓΨ :=
(Pf (K1), . . . , Pf (Km), G(·)), we conclude that the mixed catalog game

(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(α∗k(·), i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·))mk=0)mj=1

determined by the randomized endogenous mechanism (α∗k(·), i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·))mk=0 has
a Nash equilibrium,
λ∗(·) = (λ∗1(·), . . . ,λ∗m(·)),
and thus we conclude that
(α∗k(·), i∗k(·, ·), f∗k (·, ·))mk=0
is a randomized endogenous Nash mechanism.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the game with an endogenous sharing rule
ΓΨ := (Pf (K1), . . . , Pf (Km),G(·))
where again
G(·) = coF (C) = co UT Ψ(t, C)dμ(t).
Because the probability space of agent types is atomless, in fact we have,
G(·) = coF (C) = F (C) =
]
T
Ψ(t, C)dμ(t).
Let (g∗(·),λ∗(·)) be a solution (see Lemma 3). By Lemma 4, the Rm-valued en-
dogenous sharing rule g∗(·) ∈ ΣF can be implemented via an endogenous mechanism
(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ such that for all C ∈ P
g∗(C)
= (g∗1(C), . . . , g
∗
m(C))
=
U
T π1(t, (i
∗(t, C), f∗(t, C)), C)dμ(t), . . . ,
U
T πm(t, (i
∗(t, C), f∗(t, C)), C)dμ(t)

.
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Because (g∗(·),λ∗(·)) is a solution to the game ΓΨ := (Pf (K1), . . . , Pf (Km),G(·)),
where due to the atomless condition G(·) = F (·), we conclude that the mixed catalog
game 
(∆(Pf (Kj)))
m
j=1 , (Qj(·, ·|(i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)))mj=1

determined by the endogenous mechanism (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) ∈ ΣΦ has a Nash equilib-
rium,
λ∗(·) = (λ∗1(·), . . . ,λ∗m(·)),
and thus we conclude that (i∗(·, ·), f∗(·, ·)) is an endogenous Nash mechanism.
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